【by Rose Molloy】

An authoritarian regime that incorporates democratic institutions and procedures may initially seem counterintuitive due to the apparent incongruence between democracy and authoritarianism. However, authoritarian regimes can use democratic features to their advantage in a variety of ways. Electoral authoritarian regimes use elections to increase state legitimacy, collect information on public opinion, and even generate elite unity through power-sharing arrangements. Because electoral authoritarian regimes instrumentalize democratic procedures and institutions to propagate their political agenda, they are less inclined to resort to more heavy-handed overtly repressive or downright violent mechanisms of control. Such indiscreet methods of population management often result in both domestic and international backlash. This is largely a result of the globalization of Western liberal democratic ideals that followed the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Electoral authoritarian regimes are more likely to be tolerated by the international community, and also create constraints on the regime which reinforce norms and hinder autocrats’ ability to exert excessive force on their populations.

Scholars have argued that electoral authoritarian regimes are more durable than other authoritarian regime types because they rely on procedural legitimacy rather than overtly repressive mechanisms. Procedural legitimacy can be understood as legitimacy resulting from the existence of meaningful formal institutions of accountability which sustain perceptions that the political system is fair and just (Ding 2020 528). However, democratic institutions and procedures are not a necessary precondition for legitimacy in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian leaders can also legitimize their rule by providing citizens with goods or engaging in political performances that lead citizens to believe that the government is performing well. High performance indicates performance legitimacy, and theatrical political gestures suggest performative governance (Ding 2020). While these methods are distinct, they can be understood as complementary. Examining different forms of legitimation will problematize the argument that electoral authoritarian regimes are more durable than other kinds of authoritarian regimes that do not have democratic features. The central question this paper seeks to answer is, does procedural legitimacy in electoral authoritarian regimes produce durability, or are other forms of legitimation more effective?

I argue that authoritarian regimes that rely on performance legitimacy or performative governance are more politically durable than electoral authoritarian regimes that rely on procedural legitimacy. I show that democratic institutions and procedures open up arenas of contestation that threaten the regime, and that performance legitimation and performative governance, which can be understood in contrast to procedural legitimacy, avert this challenge by limiting arenas of contestation without relying on heavy-handed forms of repression. By comparing regime types and drawing upon the cases of Russia and China, I demonstrate that despite prevailing notions that electoral authoritarian regimes increase overall legitimacy and consequently durability, authoritarian regimes can achieve the same effect of legitimation through performance and performative governance while simultaneously reducing the risk of resistance and uprisings more effectively than electoral authoritarian regimes. I begin by discussing how democratic institutions and procedures impact authoritarian regimes by creating constraints that help the regime maintain legitimacy. Then, I discuss how authoritarian regimes instrumentalize these constraints to propagate their political agenda, arguing that the overarching benefit of democratic procedures and institutions is that they allow the hegemonic party to maintain control over the population without resorting to heavy-handed, overtly repressive, or downright violent mechanisms. I go on to assert that the cost of democratic rules is that they open up arenas of contestation which threaten the durability of electoral authoritarian regimes. I draw attention to the implicit assumption that authoritarian regimes that do not have democratic procedures and institutions must rely on heavy-handed, indiscreet, and violent mechanisms to stay in power. I undermine this assumption by demonstrating that authoritarian regimes can secure legitimacy through performance and performative governance. Finally, I show that authoritarian regimes that rely on performance legitimacy and performative governance are more durable because they limit arenas of contestation as they do not provide many opportunities for civil resistance.

Democratic institutions and procedures serve several integral purposes in the legitimation and survival of authoritarian regimes. Electoral authoritarian regimes are characterized by the constraints created by democratic rules. There are plenty of obstacles when it comes to asserting unequivocal control over the state, particularly because incumbents cannot eliminate or reduce democratic rules to a façade. Instead, they must find ways to discreetly work around laws without overtly violating them. Autocrats often resort to co-optation, bribery, coercion, and other more subtle mechanisms to stay in power (Levitsky and Way 2002 53). Russia’s co-optation of graffiti artists exemplifies how electoral authoritarian leaders can control the public sphere without blatantly violating democratic rules. In Russia, the government incentivized popular and publicly trusted graffiti artists to create works that bolstered the regime by promising artists regular paychecks and reserving the most visible spots in Moscow for artists who were willing to abandon their beliefs and support the regime. This method of control legitimized authoritarian rule by neutralizing dissent without resorting to violent measures, signaling not only state legitimacy but also state capacity (Lerner 2021 1767). Co-optation in general leaves much less room for criticism and backlash because it is far more subtle and technically legal compared to harsher, more blatant forms of control.

Although these constraints create challenges for autocrats, they also can benefit the regime in a variety of ways. Firstly, electoral authoritarian regimes are a response to external factors like liberal hegemony, global economic changes, the growth of international networks, the spread of mass media, and consequently of messages of democracy and human rights. Electoral authoritarian regimes are better adapted to these international developments and are less likely to encounter challenges or resistance from the international community. Secondly, electoral authoritarian regimes legitimize the state to both its elites and general population. On the one hand, elections can ease forms of distributional conflict and offer a focal point for wealth distribution when autocrats create power-sharing arrangements with elites in the ruling coalition (Blaydes 2010 4). Elections were instrumentalized this way in Egypt, where they functioned as a political tool to manage the domestic elite who might otherwise break into factions or mobilize against the regime. On the other hand, elections can also serve to legitimize the state to the masses. Electoral autocracies validate their authority with democratic institutions of majority rule (Matovski 2021 51). Electoral authoritarian regimes may garner mass popular support because they are enabled by the existence of free and fair regular elections. Lastly, elections help autocrats communicate important messages to the public and collect information they would not normally have access to regarding public opinion. Authoritarian regimes can use elections to spread information about the regime’s strength to the masses, subsequently dissuading opposition from resisting or rising up against the hegemonic party. Elections also enable the regime to collect information about supporters and dissidents. The regime can identify areas with a concentration of voter opposition and address such opposition accordingly, either through withholding goods and services from potential dissidents or rewarding supporters with increased access to goods and services thereby incentivizing other factions to support the regime (Blaydes 2010 65). While the benefits of democratic institutions and procedures vary greatly, they are all defined by the fact that they allow the regime to operate discreetly.

Electoral authoritarian regimes avoid overtly repressive or downright violent mechanisms to exert control over the population. This fact is perhaps the most conspicuous benefit of electoral authoritarian regimes. Autocrats can appease the international community because they rely on democratic procedures and institutions rather than heavy-handed overtly repressive mechanisms, and in turn, they can engage in behaviors that control the population without needing to resort to violence. This increases internal legitimacy and allows for a variety of other benefits including elite management and information collection. If autocrats can use democratic institutions and procedures to their advantage and employ non-violent tactics of management and control—thereby securing procedural legitimacy—they drastically reduce the likelihood of external backlash against the regime, elite fragmentation, and lack of information. Why then, don’t all authoritarian regimes adopt democratic institutions and procedures? What are the drawbacks of electoral authoritarianism?

 The biggest challenge for electoral authoritarian leaders is not that they have to work around constraints and worry about optics due to the existence of democratic rules. As I have argued, there are plenty of mechanisms incumbents can use to maintain control over the masses without resorting to violent measures, including bribery, co-optation, and targeted messaging about the regime. It is in fact the very existence of democratic institutions and procedures that pose a serious threat to electoral authoritarian regimes. Democratic rules open up what Levitsky and Way refer to as arenas of contestation. The result of meaningful democratic institutions and features, arenas of contestation open up opportunities through which “opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally even defeat autocratic incumbents” (Levitsky and Way 2002 54). There is always an inherent tension present in electoral authoritarian regimes because there are always opportunities to contest the regime. This creates a dilemma for authoritarian leaders, who are forced to confront their less-than-ideal options during periods of contestation; autocrats either must violate democratic rules and engage in more violent and repressive mechanisms of control, thereby risking international isolation and loss of procedural legitimacy as well as domestic conflict, or allow contestation to proceed but risk the possibility of defeat. Put simply, autocrats in electoral authoritarian regimes are always tasked with the difficult feat of allowing contestation, but not enough contestation to pose a serious threat to the regime (Levitsky and Way 2002 54). During periods of widespread dissatisfaction with the regime, it is especially important that electoral authoritarian leaders delicately walk a fine line between excessive control and inadequate control.

Understanding the durability of electoral authoritarian regimes calls for a thorough cost-benefit analysis. Specifically, determining whether the benefits of procedural legitimacy outweigh the risks of contestation will be vital in deciding what kinds of regimes are durable. If one of the most integral benefits of electoral authoritarian regimes is that they avoid overtly repressive or downright violent mechanisms to exert control over the population, an implicit assumption arises: that authoritarian regimes that do not have democratic procedures and institutions, and therefore do not have procedural legitimacy, must rely on heavy-handed, indiscreet, and violent mechanisms to stay in power. This assumption fails to acknowledge different forms of legitimation and in doing so skews the cost-benefit analysis in favor of electoral authoritarianism despite evidence that authoritarian regimes without procedural legitimacy may be more durable if they secure performance legitimacy or engage in performative governance.

Authoritarian regimes can gain legitimacy by providing citizens with social welfare and goods, thereby securing what Dickson calls performance legitimacy. Performance legitimacy is state legitimation based on the provision of public goods and general improved governance often characterized by greater attention to quality of life issues and public welfare and services such as healthcare, education, and security (Dickson 2016 165). The Chinese government is an example of an authoritarian regime that has relied on performance legitimacy rather than procedural legitimacy because the state does not have democratic institutions and procedures. The CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has been largely committed to public goods provision especially relative to China’s GDP per capita, focusing its efforts particularly on providing citizens with healthcare and education. For instance, the CCP rolled out a nationwide health insurance program in 2009 that sought to broaden access to healthcare and improve its quality. The CCP has also made efforts to expand opportunities for education. Most urban residents in China graduate from high school and access to post-secondary education has grown significantly (Dickson 2016). While a number of issues have arisen regarding China’s provision of public goods, mostly relating to uneven distribution, goods provision has been relatively successful in securing state legitimacy. Satisfaction with the government increases as public goods spending increases, indicating that performance legitimation works.

Legitimation through performance can only occur if the government is able to perform at a level deemed satisfactory by the public. When state actors are unable to appease the masses through performance, they can use performative governance to instill in their population a belief that things are improving or will improve. Performative governance is defined by Ding as “the state’s theatrical deployment of visual, verbal, and gestural symbols to foster an impression of good governance before an audience of citizens” (Ding 2020 525). If performance legitimacy is legitimation through substantive improvements to citizens’ lives, then performative governance is a method used to make an impression that things are substantively improving even though they are not. While the CCP achieved performance legitimacy in China through the provision of public goods, performative governance has been employed at the bureaucratic level to achieve the same effect of legitimation without concretely improving state conditions. Performative governance is a necessary method of legitimation because certain bureaucratic sectors have low levels of capacity and simultaneously face high levels of scrutiny. In such cases, state actors must appear to be performing well even when they are unable to do so. Sectors of the state engage in theatrical performances that aim to make the government appear responsive to public opinion through the demonstration of benevolent intentions (Ding 2020 539). Like legitimation through performance, performative governance works. In China, citizens evaluated bureaucratic offices based on state agents’ good attitudes, and expressed the belief that quality of life would improve in the future even if it was not currently improving.

Performance legitimacy and performative governance are distinct and depend upon levels of capacity and scrutiny, but both mechanisms can be used to secure legitimation in authoritarian regimes that do not have democratic institutions or procedures. In this sense, they both oppose procedural legitimacy and offer insights into how authoritarian regimes stay in power without reliance on democratic rules. Despite the implicit assumption that authoritarian regimes that do not have democratic procedures and institutions must rely on heavy-handed, indiscreet, and violent mechanisms to stay in power, the case of the CCP and smaller bureaucracies in China show that authoritarian regimes can secure legitimacy through performance and by engaging in performative governance using tactics such as goods provision, impression management, and theatrical performances. These methods secure state legitimacy while also avoiding the use of violent repressive mechanisms. Additionally, authoritarian states that do not have democratic rules naturally greatly reduce and limit arenas for contestation because without democratic institutions and procedures there are less avenues for civil resistance.

If, as I have argued, the most conspicuous benefit of electoral authoritarianism is that it avoids overtly repressive or downright violent mechanisms to exert control over the population, and if I have convincingly illustrated that authoritarian regimes without democratic institutions or procedures can achieve legitimation without resorting to overt violence, then I have shown that performance legitimacy

and performative governance have the same effect as procedural legitimacy in that all foster authoritarian rule without dependence on overt violence. Furthermore, I have argued that democratic institutions and procedures open up arenas of contestation that create opportunities for popular uprisings and civil resistance and that authoritarian regimes that do not have democratic institutions and procedures naturally limit or greatly reduce arenas of contestation. Therefore, authoritarian regimes that use performance and performative governance to secure legitimacy match the benefits of electoral authoritarian regimes that rely on procedural legitimacy, while simultaneously avoiding the drawbacks and costs of procedural legitimacy which are defined by opportunities for popular uprisings and civil resistance. Despite prevailing notions that electoral authoritarian regimes are uniquely durable because they have procedural legitimacy and rely on discrete methods of control, arenas of contestation inherent to electoral authoritarian regimes significantly weaken them. Legitimation through performance and performative governance results in increased regime durability because it has the benefit of legitimation without violence but limits arenas of contestation so that authoritarian regimes without democratic rules are less costly than electoral authoritarian regimes.